head 1.9; access; symbols pkgsrc-2013Q2:1.9.0.44 pkgsrc-2013Q2-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2012Q4:1.9.0.42 pkgsrc-2012Q4-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2011Q4:1.9.0.40 pkgsrc-2011Q4-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2011Q2:1.9.0.38 pkgsrc-2011Q2-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2009Q4:1.9.0.36 pkgsrc-2009Q4-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2008Q4:1.9.0.34 pkgsrc-2008Q4-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2008Q3:1.9.0.32 pkgsrc-2008Q3-base:1.9 cube-native-xorg:1.9.0.30 cube-native-xorg-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2008Q2:1.9.0.28 pkgsrc-2008Q2-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2008Q1:1.9.0.26 pkgsrc-2008Q1-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2007Q4:1.9.0.24 pkgsrc-2007Q4-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2007Q3:1.9.0.22 pkgsrc-2007Q3-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2007Q2:1.9.0.20 pkgsrc-2007Q2-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2007Q1:1.9.0.18 pkgsrc-2007Q1-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2006Q4:1.9.0.16 pkgsrc-2006Q4-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2006Q3:1.9.0.14 pkgsrc-2006Q3-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2006Q2:1.9.0.12 pkgsrc-2006Q2-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2006Q1:1.9.0.10 pkgsrc-2006Q1-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2005Q4:1.9.0.8 pkgsrc-2005Q4-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2005Q3:1.9.0.6 pkgsrc-2005Q3-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2005Q2:1.9.0.4 pkgsrc-2005Q2-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2005Q1:1.9.0.2 pkgsrc-2005Q1-base:1.9 pkgsrc-2004Q4:1.8.0.10 pkgsrc-2004Q4-base:1.8 pkgsrc-2004Q3:1.8.0.8 pkgsrc-2004Q3-base:1.8 pkgsrc-2004Q2:1.8.0.6 pkgsrc-2004Q2-base:1.8 pkgsrc-2004Q1:1.8.0.4 pkgsrc-2004Q1-base:1.8 pkgsrc-2003Q4:1.8.0.2 pkgsrc-2003Q4-base:1.8 pkgviews:1.5.0.4 pkgviews-base:1.5 buildlink2:1.5.0.2 buildlink2-base:1.6 netbsd-1-5-PATCH003:1.5 netbsd-1-5-PATCH001:1.5 netbsd-1-5-RELEASE:1.3 netbsd-1-4-PATCH003:1.3 netbsd-1-4-PATCH002:1.2 comdex-fall-1999:1.1 netbsd-1-4-PATCH001:1.1 netbsd-1-4-RELEASE:1.1; locks; strict; comment @# @; 1.9 date 2004.12.24.22.02.38; author jlam; state dead; branches; next 1.8; 1.8 date 2003.10.02.02.34.40; author jschauma; state Exp; branches; next 1.7; 1.7 date 2003.03.21.18.40.49; author seb; state Exp; branches; next 1.6; 1.6 date 2002.08.04.15.47.48; author fredb; state dead; branches; next 1.5; 1.5 date 2001.05.11.22.14.11; author tron; state Exp; branches 1.5.2.1; next 1.4; 1.4 date 2001.04.09.04.29.24; author fredb; state Exp; branches; next 1.3; 1.3 date 2000.04.22.05.07.04; author fredb; state Exp; branches; next 1.2; 1.2 date 99.11.25.18.51.47; author erh; state Exp; branches; next 1.1; 1.1 date 99.05.01.17.12.00; author tv; state Exp; branches; next ; 1.5.2.1 date 2002.08.22.11.12.33; author jlam; state dead; branches; next ; desc @@ 1.9 log @Update security/openssl to 0.9.7e. Changes from openssl-0.9.6m are too numerous to be listed here, but include adding a new DES API (support for the old one is still present). Changes to the pkgsrc structure include: * Install the shared libraries with a version number that matches the OpenSSL version number * Move some of the less often-used c_* utilities back into the examples directory. * Drop support for using the RSAREF library and always use the built-in RSA code instead. @ text @$NetBSD: patch-aj,v 1.8 2003/10/02 02:34:40 jschauma Exp $ --- crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.orig 2003-04-16 02:25:25.000000000 -0400 +++ crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c 2003-10-01 21:54:25.000000000 -0400 @@@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@@@ { RSA *r=RSA_new_method(NULL); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING + r->flags|=RSA_FLAG_BLINDING; +#endif + return r; } @ 1.8 log @Update to 0.9.6k: Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002] *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching, because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading from the external cache. This problem was masked, when SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set. (Found by Steve Haslam .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33. [Zeev Lieber ] *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling EVP_cleanup(). [Richard Levitte] *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not being properly terminated. [Richard Levitte] *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String. [stefank@@valicert.com via Richard Levitte] *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural change. [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El] *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix initialization code race conditions in SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(), ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(). [Patrick McCormick , Bodo Moeller] *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik (see [openssl.org #212]). [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT. [Steve Henson] @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD: $ @ 1.7 log @* Add patch from http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt: Researchers have discovered a timing attack on RSA keys, to which OpenSSL is generally vulnerable, unless RSA blinding has been turned on. Typically, it will not have been, because it is not easily possible to do so when using OpenSSL to provide SSL or TLS. The enclosed patch switches blinding on by default. Applications that wish to can remove the blinding with RSA_blinding_off(), but this is not generally advised. It is also possible to disable it completely by defining OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING at compile-time. The performance impact of blinding appears to be small (a few percent). This problem affects many applications using OpenSSL, in particular, almost all SSL-enabled Apaches. You should rebuild and reinstall OpenSSL, and all affected applications. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0147 to this issue. * Add patch from http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt: Czech cryptologists Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, and Tomas Rosa have come up with an extension of the "Bleichenbacher attack" on RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5 padding as used in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. Their attack requires the attacker to open millions of SSL/TLS connections to the server under attack; the server's behaviour when faced with specially made-up RSA ciphertexts can reveal information that in effect allows the attacker to perform a single RSA private key operation on a ciphertext of its choice using the server's RSA key. Note that the server's RSA key is not compromised in this attack. * Bump PKGREVISION. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD$ d3 5 a7 3 --- crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.orig 2001-02-24 17:32:30.000000000 +0000 +++ crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c @@@@ -71,7 +71,13 @@@@ static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *r a8 5 RSA *RSA_new(void) { - return(RSA_new_method(NULL)); + RSA *r=RSA_new_method(NULL); + d13 1 a13 1 + return r; a15 1 void RSA_set_default_method(RSA_METHOD *meth) @ 1.6 log @Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer , Alon Kantor (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen : PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD: patch-aj,v 1.5 2001/05/11 22:14:11 tron Exp $ d3 3 a5 10 --- e_os.h.orig Thu Sep 21 11:23:14 2000 +++ e_os.h Sat May 12 00:03:27 2001 @@@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@@@ -/* e_os.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@@@ -297,7 +296,7 @@@@ typedef unsigned long clock_t; # endif d7 13 a19 5 -# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf" +# define OPENSSL_CONF "etc/openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define RFILE ".rnd" # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':' @ 1.5 log @Convert all patches to unified output format. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD$ @ 1.5.2.1 log @Merge changes from pkgsrc-current into the buildlink2 branch for the packages that have buildlink2.mk files. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD: patch-aj,v 1.5 2001/05/11 22:14:11 tron Exp $ @ 1.4 log @Update to OpenSSL 0.9.6. Update contributed by Dave Burgess, in PR pkg/12569. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6: o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries. o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers. o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application. o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application. o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility. [*] o MD4 now included. o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check. o Support for external crypto devices [1]. o Enhanced EVP interface. [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate distribution. See the file README.ENGINE. [*] Not installed with the package. @ text @d1 18 a18 26 *** e_os.h.orig Thu Sep 21 04:23:14 2000 --- e_os.h Sat Apr 7 13:19:47 2001 *************** *** 1,4 **** - /* e_os.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * --- 1,3 ---- *************** *** 297,303 **** typedef unsigned long clock_t; # endif ! # define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define RFILE ".rnd" # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':' --- 296,302 ---- typedef unsigned long clock_t; # endif ! # define OPENSSL_CONF "etc/openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define RFILE ".rnd" # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':' @ 1.3 log @Defuzz patches. @ text @d1 26 a26 13 $NetBSD$ --- e_os.h.orig Thu Mar 23 14:31:49 2000 +++ e_os.h Fri Apr 21 23:51:15 2000 @@@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@@@ # define ssize_t int /* ditto */ # endif -# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf" +# define OPENSSL_CONF "etc/openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define RFILE ".rnd" # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':' @ 1.2 log @Update openssl to 0.9.4. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD: $ d3 5 a7 5 --- e_os.h.orig Thu Jun 10 03:12:20 1999 +++ e_os.h Wed Oct 20 17:50:34 1999 @@@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@@@ /* !defined VMS */ # include OPENSSL_UNISTD @ 1.1 log @Fix m68k compile as provided by in pkg/7152. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD$ d3 5 a7 4 --- crypto/bn/bn_div.c.orig Sat May 1 13:10:52 1999 +++ crypto/bn/bn_div.c Sat May 1 13:11:42 1999 @@@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@@@ #include "bn_lcl.h" d9 5 a13 6 /* The old slow way */ -#if 0 +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && defined(__m68k__) && (__GNUC_MINOR__ == 91) int BN_div(dv, rem, m, d,ctx) BIGNUM *dv; BIGNUM *rem; @