head 1.2; access; symbols pkgsrc-2013Q2:1.2.0.8 pkgsrc-2013Q2-base:1.2 pkgsrc-2012Q4:1.2.0.6 pkgsrc-2012Q4-base:1.2 pkgsrc-2011Q4:1.2.0.4 pkgsrc-2011Q4-base:1.2 pkgsrc-2011Q2:1.2.0.2 pkgsrc-2011Q2-base:1.2 pkgsrc-2010Q4:1.1.0.42 pkgsrc-2010Q4-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2010Q3:1.1.0.40 pkgsrc-2010Q3-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2010Q2:1.1.0.38 pkgsrc-2010Q2-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2010Q1:1.1.0.36 pkgsrc-2010Q1-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2009Q4:1.1.0.34 pkgsrc-2009Q4-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2009Q3:1.1.0.32 pkgsrc-2009Q3-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2009Q2:1.1.0.30 pkgsrc-2009Q2-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2009Q1:1.1.0.28 pkgsrc-2009Q1-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2008Q4:1.1.0.26 pkgsrc-2008Q4-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2008Q3:1.1.0.24 pkgsrc-2008Q3-base:1.1 cube-native-xorg:1.1.0.22 cube-native-xorg-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2008Q2:1.1.0.20 pkgsrc-2008Q2-base:1.1 cwrapper:1.1.0.18 pkgsrc-2008Q1:1.1.0.16 pkgsrc-2008Q1-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2007Q4:1.1.0.14 pkgsrc-2007Q4-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2007Q3:1.1.0.12 pkgsrc-2007Q3-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2007Q2:1.1.0.10 pkgsrc-2007Q2-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2007Q1:1.1.0.8 pkgsrc-2007Q1-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2006Q4:1.1.0.6 pkgsrc-2006Q4-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2006Q3:1.1.0.4 pkgsrc-2006Q3-base:1.1 pkgsrc-2006Q2:1.1.0.2; locks; strict; comment @# @; 1.2 date 2011.03.22.23.31.04; author tez; state dead; branches; next 1.1; 1.1 date 2006.08.09.17.31.10; author salo; state Exp; branches 1.1.2.1; next ; 1.1.2.1 date 2006.08.09.17.31.10; author ghen; state dead; branches; next 1.1.2.2; 1.1.2.2 date 2006.08.10.07.00.34; author ghen; state Exp; branches; next ; desc @@ 1.2 log @Update MIT Kerberos to v1.8.3 with the latest security patches up to and including MITKRB5-SA-2011-003. Please see http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/ for the change logs since v1.4.2 Note that the r-services, telnetd and ftpd services and the related client applications are now in a separate pacakge security/mit-krb5-appl. @ text @$NetBSD: patch-am,v 1.1 2006/08/09 17:31:10 salo Exp $ Security fix for SA21402. --- appl/gssftp/ftpd/ftpd.c.orig 2005-01-21 23:46:46.000000000 +0100 +++ appl/gssftp/ftpd/ftpd.c 2006-08-09 18:52:53.000000000 +0200 @@@@ -1368,7 +1368,9 @@@@ getdatasock(fmode) goto bad; sleep(tries); } - (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + if (krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid)) { + fatal("seteuid user"); + } #ifdef IP_TOS #ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT on = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; @@@@ -1378,7 +1380,9 @@@@ getdatasock(fmode) #endif return (fdopen(s, fmode)); bad: - (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + if (krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid)) { + fatal("seteuid user"); + } (void) close(s); return (NULL); } @@@@ -2187,7 +2191,9 @@@@ passive() (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); goto pasv_error; } - (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + if (krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid)) { + fatal("seteuid user"); + } len = sizeof(pasv_addr); if (getsockname(pdata, (struct sockaddr *) &pasv_addr, &len) < 0) goto pasv_error; @ 1.1 log @Security fixes for SA21402: "A security issue has been reported in Kerberos, which potentially can be exploited by malicious, local users to perform certain actions with escalated privileges. The security issue is caused due to missing checks for whether the "setuid()" call has succeeded in the bundled krshd and v4rcp applications. This can be exploited to disclose or manipulate the contents of arbitrary files or execute arbitrary code with root privileges if the "setuid()" call fails due to e.g. resource limits." http://secunia.com/advisories/21402/ http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3083 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3084 http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2006-001-setuid.txt Bump PKGREVISION. @ text @d1 1 a1 1 $NetBSD$ @ 1.1.2.1 log @file patch-am was added on branch pkgsrc-2006Q2 on 2006-08-09 17:31:10 +0000 @ text @d1 39 @ 1.1.2.2 log @Pullup ticket 1783 - requested by salo security fix for mit-krb5 Revisions pulled up: - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/Makefile 1.38 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/distinfo 1.15 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches/patch-am 1.1 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches/patch-an 1.1 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches/patch-ao 1.1 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches/patch-ap 1.1 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches/patch-aq 1.1 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches/patch-ar 1.1 - pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches/patch-as 1.1 Module Name: pkgsrc Committed By: salo Date: Wed Aug 9 17:31:10 UTC 2006 Modified Files: pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5: Makefile distinfo Added Files: pkgsrc/security/mit-krb5/patches: patch-am patch-an patch-ao patch-ap patch-aq patch-ar patch-as Log Message: Security fixes for SA21402: "A security issue has been reported in Kerberos, which potentially can be exploited by malicious, local users to perform certain actions with escalated privileges. The security issue is caused due to missing checks for whether the "setuid()" call has succeeded in the bundled krshd and v4rcp applications. This can be exploited to disclose or manipulate the contents of arbitrary files or execute arbitrary code with root privileges if the "setuid()" call fails due to e.g. resource limits." http://secunia.com/advisories/21402/ http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3083 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3084 http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2006-001-setuid.txt Bump PKGREVISION. @ text @a0 39 $NetBSD: patch-am,v 1.1.2.1 2006/08/10 07:00:34 ghen Exp $ Security fix for SA21402. --- appl/gssftp/ftpd/ftpd.c.orig 2005-01-21 23:46:46.000000000 +0100 +++ appl/gssftp/ftpd/ftpd.c 2006-08-09 18:52:53.000000000 +0200 @@@@ -1368,7 +1368,9 @@@@ getdatasock(fmode) goto bad; sleep(tries); } - (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + if (krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid)) { + fatal("seteuid user"); + } #ifdef IP_TOS #ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT on = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; @@@@ -1378,7 +1380,9 @@@@ getdatasock(fmode) #endif return (fdopen(s, fmode)); bad: - (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + if (krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid)) { + fatal("seteuid user"); + } (void) close(s); return (NULL); } @@@@ -2187,7 +2191,9 @@@@ passive() (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); goto pasv_error; } - (void) krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + if (krb5_seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid)) { + fatal("seteuid user"); + } len = sizeof(pasv_addr); if (getsockname(pdata, (struct sockaddr *) &pasv_addr, &len) < 0) goto pasv_error; @