head 1.1; branch 1.1.1; access; symbols netbsd-11-0-RC5:1.1.1.1 netbsd-11-0-RC4:1.1.1.1 netbsd-11-0-RC3:1.1.1.1 netbsd-11-0-RC2:1.1.1.1 netbsd-11-0-RC1:1.1.1.1 perseant-exfatfs-base-20250801:1.1.1.1 netbsd-11:1.1.1.1.0.14 netbsd-11-base:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-1-RELEASE:1.1.1.1 perseant-exfatfs-base-20240630:1.1.1.1 perseant-exfatfs:1.1.1.1.0.12 perseant-exfatfs-base:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-0-RELEASE:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-0-RC6:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-0-RC5:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-0-RC4:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-0-RC3:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-0-RC2:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10-0-RC1:1.1.1.1 heimdal-7-8-0:1.1.1.1 netbsd-10:1.1.1.1.0.10 netbsd-10-base:1.1.1.1 cjep_sun2x-base1:1.1.1.1 cjep_sun2x:1.1.1.1.0.8 cjep_sun2x-base:1.1.1.1 cjep_staticlib_x-base1:1.1.1.1 cjep_staticlib_x:1.1.1.1.0.6 cjep_staticlib_x-base:1.1.1.1 phil-wifi-20200421:1.1.1.1 phil-wifi-20200411:1.1.1.1 phil-wifi:1.1.1.1.0.4 is-mlppp:1.1.1.1.0.2 is-mlppp-base:1.1.1.1 phil-wifi-20200406:1.1.1.1 heimdal-7-7-0:1.1.1.1 HEIMDAL:1.1.1; locks; strict; comment @# @; 1.1 date 2019.12.15.22.45.43; author christos; state Exp; branches 1.1.1.1; next ; commitid dIMahZVsqaHy4ROB; 1.1.1.1 date 2019.12.15.22.45.43; author christos; state Exp; branches 1.1.1.1.4.1; next ; commitid dIMahZVsqaHy4ROB; 1.1.1.1.4.1 date 2019.12.15.22.45.43; author martin; state dead; branches; next 1.1.1.1.4.2; commitid Qli2aW9E74UFuA3C; 1.1.1.1.4.2 date 2020.04.08.14.03.13; author martin; state Exp; branches; next 1.1.1.1.4.3; commitid Qli2aW9E74UFuA3C; 1.1.1.1.4.3 date 2020.04.21.18.41.47; author martin; state dead; branches; next ; commitid 86tA4aEmdr3VCh5C; desc @@ 1.1 log @Initial revision @ text @[ca] default_ca = user [usr] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = usr_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [ocsp] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = ocsp_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [usr_ke] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = usr_cert_ke default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [usr_ds] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = usr_cert_ds default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [pkinit_client] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = pkinit_client_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [pkinit_kdc] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = pkinit_kdc_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [https] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = https_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [subca] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = v3_ca default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [req] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert string_mask = utf8only [v3_ca] subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always basicConstraints = CA:true keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign, keyEncipherment, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature [usr_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [usr_cert_ke] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [proxy_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:0,policy:text:foo [pkinitc_principals] princ1 = GeneralString:bar [pkinitc_principal_seq] name_type = EXP:0,INTEGER:1 name_string = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitc_principals [pkinitc_princ_name] realm = EXP:0,GeneralString:TEST.H5L.SE principal_name = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitc_principal_seq [pkinit_client_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:pkinitc_princ_name [https_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment #extendedKeyUsage = https-server XXX subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [pkinit_kdc_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment extendedKeyUsage = 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5 subjectKeyIdentifier = hash subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:pkinitkdc_princ_name [pkinitkdc_princ_name] realm = EXP:0,GeneralString:TEST.H5L.SE principal_name = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitkdc_principal_seq [pkinitkdc_principal_seq] name_type = EXP:0,INTEGER:1 name_string = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitkdc_principals [pkinitkdc_principals] princ1 = GeneralString:krbtgt princ2 = GeneralString:TEST.H5L.SE [proxy10_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:10,policy:text:foo [usr_cert_ds] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [ocsp_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # ocsp-nocheck and kp-OCSPSigning extendedKeyUsage = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9 subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [req_distinguished_name] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = SE countryName_min = 2 countryName_max = 2 organizationalName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) commonName_max = 64 #[req_attributes] #challengePassword = A challenge password #challengePassword_min = 4 #challengePassword_max = 20 [policy_match] countryName = match commonName = supplied @ 1.1.1.1 log @Release Notes - Heimdal - Version Heimdal 7.7 Bug fixes PKCS#11 hcrypto back-end . initialize the p11_module_load function list . verify that not only is a mechanism present but that its mechanism info states that it offers the required encryption, decryption or digest services krb5: . Starting with 7.6, Heimdal permitted requesting authenticated anonymous tickets. However, it did not verify that a KDC in fact returned an anonymous ticket when one was requested. . Cease setting the KDCOption reaquest_anonymous flag when issuing S4UProxy (constrained delegation) TGS requests. . when the Win2K PKINIT compatibility option is set, do not require krbtgt otherName to match when validating KDC certificate. . set PKINIT_BTMM flag per Apple implementation . use memset_s() instead of memset() kdc: . When generating KRB5SignedPath in the AS, use the reply client name rather than the one from the request, so validation will work correctly in the TGS. . allow checksum of PA-FOR-USER to be HMAC_MD5. Even if TGT used an enctype with a different checksum. Per [MS-SFU] 2.2.1 PA-FOR-USER the checksum is always HMAC_MD5, and that's what Windows and MIT clients send. In Heimdal both the client and kdc use instead the checksum of the TGT, and therefore work with each other but Windows and MIT clients fail against Heimdal KDC. Both Windows and MIT KDC would allow any keyed checksum to be used so Heimdal client work fine against it. Change Heimdal KDC to allow HMAC_MD5 even for non RC4 based TGT in order to support per-spec clients. . use memset_s() instead of memset() . Detect Heimdal 1.0 through 7.6 clients that issue S4UProxy (constrained delegation) TGS Requests with the request anonymous flag set. These requests will be treated as S4UProxy requests and not anonymous requests. HDB: . Set SQLite3 backend default page size to 8KB. . Add hdb_set_sync() method kadmind: . disable HDB sync during database load avoiding unnecessary disk i/o. ipropd: . disable HDB sync during receive_everything. Doing an fsync per-record when receiving the complete HDB is a performance disaster. Among other things, if the HDB is very large, then one slave receving a full HDB can cause other slaves to timeout and, if HDB write activity is high enough to cause iprop log truncation, then also need full syncs, which leads to a cycle of full syncs for all slaves until HDB write activity drops. Allowing the iprop log to be larger helps, but improving receive_everything() performance helps even more. kinit: . Anonymous PKINIT tickets discard the realm information used to locate the issuing AS. Store the issuing realm in the credentials cache in order to locate a KDC which can renew them. . Do not leak the result of krb5_cc_get_config() when determining anonymous PKINIT start realm. klist: . Show transited-policy-checked, ok-as-delegate and anonymous flags when listing credentials. tests: . Regenerate certs so that they expire before the 2038 armageddon so the test suite will pass on 32-bit operating systems until the underlying issues can be resolved. Solaris: . Define _STDC_C11_BCI for memset_s prototype build tooling: . Convert from python 2 to python 3 documentation . rename verify-password to verify-password-quality . hprop default mode is encrypt . kadmind "all" permission does not include "get-keys" . verify-password-quality might not be stateless Release Notes - Heimdal - Version Heimdal 7.6 Security (#555) CVE-2018-16860 Heimdal KDC: Reject PA-S4U2Self with unkeyed checksum When the Heimdal KDC checks the checksum that is placed on the S4U2Self packet by the server to protect the requested principal against modification, it does not confirm that the checksum algorithm that protects the user name (principal) in the request is keyed. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept the request to the KDC to modify the packet by replacing the user name (principal) in the request with any desired user name (principal) that exists in the KDC and replace the checksum protecting that name with a CRC32 checksum (which requires no prior knowledge to compute). This would allow a S4U2Self ticket requested on behalf of user name (principal) user@@EXAMPLE.COM to any service to be changed to a S4U2Self ticket with a user name (principal) of Administrator@@EXAMPLE.COM. This ticket would then contain the PAC of the modified user name (principal). CVE-2019-12098, client-only: RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key exchange when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active attacker to become a man-in-the-middle. Bug fixes Happy eyeballs: Don't wait for responses from known-unreachable KDCs. kdc: check return copy_Realm, copy_PrincipalName, copy_EncryptionKey kinit: . cleanup temporary ccaches . see man page for "kinit --anonymous" command line syntax change kdc: Make anonymous AS-requests more RFC8062-compliant. Updated expired test certificates Solaris: . PKCS#11 hcrypto backend broken since 7.0.1 . Building with Sun Pro C Features kuser: support authenticated anonymous AS-REQs in kinit kdc: support for anonymous TGS-REQs kgetcred support for anonymous service tickets Support builds with OpenSSL 1.1.1 Building from source: Heimdal 7.5 This is a security release of Heimdal This release patches a remote denial of service CVE-2017-17439: In Heimdal 7.1 through 7.4, remote unauthenticated attackers are able to crash the KDC by sending a crafted UDP packet containing empty data fields for client name or realm. Heimdal 7.4 This is a security release of Heimdal. This release patches a critical vulnerability: CVE-2017-11103: Orpheus' Lyre KDC-REP service name validation In _krb5_extract_ticket() the KDC-REP service name must be obtained from encrypted version stored in 'enc_part' instead of the unencrypted version stored in 'ticket'. Use of the unecrypted version provides an opportunity for successful server impersonation and other attacks. Identified by Jeffrey Altman, Viktor Duchovni and Nico Williams. See https://www.orpheus-lyre.info/ This is the Heimdal 7.3 security release. This release addresses CVE-2017-6594. See the NEWS file for details. Heimdal 7.2 This is the Heimdal 7.2 release. @ text @@ 1.1.1.1.4.1 log @file openssl.1.1.cnf was added on branch phil-wifi on 2020-04-08 14:03:13 +0000 @ text @d1 185 @ 1.1.1.1.4.2 log @Merge changes from current as of 20200406 @ text @a0 185 [ca] default_ca = user [usr] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = usr_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [ocsp] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = ocsp_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [usr_ke] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = usr_cert_ke default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [usr_ds] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = usr_cert_ds default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [pkinit_client] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = pkinit_client_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [pkinit_kdc] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = pkinit_kdc_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [https] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = https_cert default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [subca] database = index.txt serial = serial x509_extensions = v3_ca default_md=sha1 policy = policy_match email_in_dn = no certs = . [req] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert string_mask = utf8only [v3_ca] subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always basicConstraints = CA:true keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign, keyEncipherment, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature [usr_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [usr_cert_ke] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [proxy_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:0,policy:text:foo [pkinitc_principals] princ1 = GeneralString:bar [pkinitc_principal_seq] name_type = EXP:0,INTEGER:1 name_string = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitc_principals [pkinitc_princ_name] realm = EXP:0,GeneralString:TEST.H5L.SE principal_name = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitc_principal_seq [pkinit_client_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:pkinitc_princ_name [https_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment #extendedKeyUsage = https-server XXX subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [pkinit_kdc_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment extendedKeyUsage = 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5 subjectKeyIdentifier = hash subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:pkinitkdc_princ_name [pkinitkdc_princ_name] realm = EXP:0,GeneralString:TEST.H5L.SE principal_name = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitkdc_principal_seq [pkinitkdc_principal_seq] name_type = EXP:0,INTEGER:1 name_string = EXP:1,SEQUENCE:pkinitkdc_principals [pkinitkdc_principals] princ1 = GeneralString:krbtgt princ2 = GeneralString:TEST.H5L.SE [proxy10_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment subjectKeyIdentifier = hash proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:10,policy:text:foo [usr_cert_ds] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [ocsp_cert] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # ocsp-nocheck and kp-OCSPSigning extendedKeyUsage = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9 subjectKeyIdentifier = hash [req_distinguished_name] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = SE countryName_min = 2 countryName_max = 2 organizationalName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) commonName_max = 64 #[req_attributes] #challengePassword = A challenge password #challengePassword_min = 4 #challengePassword_max = 20 [policy_match] countryName = match commonName = supplied @ 1.1.1.1.4.3 log @Sync with HEAD @ text @@